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Abstract
This paper empirically investigates a firm’s propensity to patent. It thereby
builds on a theoretical model on a firms’ patenting decision in a market with
vertically differentiated products. We deduce and empirically test several hy-
potheses from the theoretical results regarding patenting and rival’s market
entry decision presented in Zaby (2009). Our main finding is that in indus-
tries which are characterized by easy-to-use knowledge spillover, the techno-
logical lead of the inventor is reduced to such an extent that the propensity
to patent increases. Furthermore, the intensity of patent protection has a
delaying impact on rival’s market entry.
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1 Introduction
The fact that not every innovation is patented has long since been discussed
in economic literature (see e.g. Horstmann et al. (1985)). Empirical evidence
points in the same direction: With data from the 1993 European Commu-
nity Innovation Survey (CIS), Arundel (2001) explicitly analyzes the relative
importance of secrecy versus patents and finds that a higher percentage of
firms in all size classes rate secrecy as more valuable than patents. In their
seminal empirical study Cohen et al. (2000) find that a major reason for
the firm’s decision not to patent is the disclosure requirement that is linked
to a patent. Thus it is the loss of a technological leadership caused by the
required disclosure of proprietary knowledge which drives the propensity not
to patent: The patentee has to fear that the transfer of enabling knowledge
included in the patent application may benefit his rivals instantaneously by
facilitating a rapid catch-up.
This paper empirically investigates the disclosure requirement’s significance
for the propensity to patent and the competitor’s market entry behaviour
subsequent to the innovator’s patenting decision. It thereby builds on the
theoretical model presented in Zaby (2009). In line with patent law, Zaby as-
sumes that a patent requires the immediate and full disclosure of all technical
details concerning a patented discovery.1 This transfer of enabling knowledge
benefits a non-inventor instantaneously so that due to the disclosure effect
the profits of the innovator will decrease. This negative effect of patenting is
opposed by a positive protective effect. Overall the patenting decision of an
inventor thus has to balance the tradeoff between the benefits of temporary
monopoly power on the one hand, and the drawback of the complete disclo-
sure of enabling knowledge on the other. Naturally, the positive effect may
be enhanced by stronger property rights while the negative effect is subject
to the impact of the disclosure requirement.
In Zaby (2009) the patenting decision of a successful inventor is introduced
into a market with vertically differentiated products. She considers two firms
which are asymmetric in their capabilities to adopt a new technology: one
firm is a successful inventor and possesses the complete technological know-
ledge about its invention. Its rival, the non-inventor, has failed to invent
so far, but has accumulated some know-how. Assuming that the quality
of the invention increases costlessly over time, the decision when to market
the new technology, i.e. when to innovate, is equivalent to the decision at
which quality level to market it. The first adopter of a new product will
realize monopoly profits offering the innovative technology at a relatively
1See Johnson, Popp (2003) for empirical evidence concerning this assumption.
low quality up to the point in time when a rival firm enters and offers the
new technology incorporated in a product of higher quality. Subsequently,
both firms compete in an asymmetric duopoly. Additionally to the adoption
decision the inventor faces the choice between a patent and secrecy to pro-
tect his discovery. A patent protects a given quality range from the entry
of a rival and due to the setting with vertically differentiated products Zaby
(2009), following van Dijk (1996), denotes the intensity of patent protection
as the height of a patent. Assuming that patent protection is not perfect in
the sense that it cannot cover all possible product qualities, the non-inventor
may still enter the market with a non-infringing product in spite of a patent.
As the non-innovator is forced to realize a given level of product quality to
enter the market without infringing the patent, his date of market entry is
possibly postponed by a patent. From the viewpoint of the innovator one
can say, that the threat of market entry is mitigated by patenting.
From the date of market entry, the innovator profits from temporary monopoly
power until a competitor is able to enter with a sufficiently improved – non-
infringing – version of the basic innovation. At the same time he faces the
drawback of the disclosure requirement linked to the patent which may en-
able the competitor to accomplish the follow-up innovation at an earlier point
in time. Methodically the strategic decisions form a three stage game: On
the first stage the inventor decides whether to patent or to rely on secrecy,
on the second stage both firms choose their qualities and on the last stage of
the game they compete in prices.
Due to the dynamic setting, patent protection may eventually come into op-
eration even before the inventor decides to launch the new product on the
market, thus leaving him more time to improve the basic invention in order
to make a delayed market entry more profitable without facing the threat of
a rival’s entry. Our main result is that the inventor will patent his invention
whenever his technological headstart is moderate and that he will rather rely
on secrecy whenever his technological headstart is high. The latter is due to
the fact that the positive protective effect of a patent is outweighed by its
negative effect of the required disclosure.
Several empirical studies aim at analyzing the propensity to patent. Using
the first wave of the German part of the CIS, Ko¨nig , Licht (1995) investigate
the importance of patents compared to non-legal appropriation methods of
research output. They find that the non-legal intellectual protection tools are
more effective than patents. Moreover, Ko¨nig , Licht (1995) conclude that
firms rather rely on a bundle of legal and non-legal appropriation mechanisms
instead of solely patenting. In a direct comparison of the use of patents ver-
sus secrecy Hussinger (2006), using data from the year 2000 CIS on German
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manufacturing firms, finds that patents are effective to protect innovations,
i.e. commercialized inventions, while secrecy is rather important for inven-
tions which are in the pre-market phase. She implements the measure sales
of new products – which reflect the market success of innovations – as de-
pendent variable and thereby obtains a new measure of the importance of
intellectual property protection.
Arundel , Kabla (1998) use the data from the PACE survey of Europe’s largest
industrial firms to calculate the sales-weighted patent propensity rates for 19
industries. They find that only four industry sectors reveal patent propensi-
ties which exceed 50 %.2
This paper’s empirical analysis is based on the Mannheim Innovation Panel
of the year 2005 which includes characteristics of firms’ innovation activities,
like expenditures, R&D activities, IP protection mechanisms, but also firms’
assessment of their competitive situation.
The analysis first looks at firms’ propensity to patent which is linked to
the technological lead and its reduction due to the usability of unintended
knowledge spillover prevailing in the prospective industry. In order to reflect
the reduction of the technological lead due to the usability of unintended
knowledge spillover, we include an interaction term in our probit estimation.
From the theoretical model we expect that the impact of the technological
lead is negative, whereas the interaction term should turn out to be positive.
The second empirical test analyzes the competitors’ market entry decision.
For its operationalization we use the firms’ assessment of whether their mar-
ket position is threatened by rivals’ entry. This variable is measured on a
four point Likert scale ranging from ”fully applies” to ”does not apply at
all” and thus reflects the degree of entry threat. A high entry threat should
in this setting reflect a soon market entry by competitors. To analyze the
perceived entry threat we estimate an ordered probit and relate it to tech-
nological lead, the usability of unintended knowledge spillover and patent
breadth. According to the theoretical model, we conjecture that techno-
logical lead and patent breadth lead to a lower threat of entry whereas we
hypothesize the opposite effect for the interaction term of technological lead
and the usability of spillover.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we state the
hypotheses which summarize the underlying theoretical model and present
their empirical implementation. The following section 3 describes the data set
and our proceeding in restricting the data sample and defining the variables.
Section 4 presents our empirical results and Section 5 concludes.
2These are pharmaceuticals, chemicals, machinery, and precision instruments.
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2 Hypotheses and their empirical implementation
In this section, we derive hypotheses based on the theoretical model presented
in Zaby (2009). Contrary to the theoretical procedure which uses backward
induction we will use a chronological approach for the empirical analysis, i.e.
we will first empirically investigate the driving factors behind the patenting
decision and will then, in a second step, examine the theoretical results con-
cerning rival’s timing of market entry, i.e. the threat of entry the innovator
faces. Some crucial assumptions were made to solve the theoretical model:
The setting in which the model and its results are valid is one of vertically
differentiated products, i.e. the firms compete in quality.
The patenting decision on the first stage of the three-stage game entails two
opposing effects: a protective effect and a disclosure effect. Obviously, a firm
decides to patent if profits generated by the protective effect exceed the re-
duction of profits by the disclosure effect, otherwise the results of the R&D
activities are appropriated by secrecy. Both effects are driven by the three
parameters: extent of the technological lead, γ, usability of technological
spillover, λ, and intensity of patent protection, φ. The spillover are expected
to be higher in industries where reverse engineering is easy. While, for exam-
ple, in pharmaceuticals the patenting rate is rather high, in an industry sector
such as precision instruments the patenting rate is found to be rather low.
Relating this observation to the fact that a patent forces the disclosure of
technological knowledge and therefore facilitates the research efforts of rival
firms, some industry specific differences concerning the usability of the dis-
closed information have to exist, which account for the difference in patenting
rates. In the theoretical model, this aspect was captured by linking the tech-
nological headstart of a successful inventor to an industry specific parameter
that reflects the easiness of reverse engineering (see Arundel et al. (1995)).
Summarizing the theoretical results concerning the patenting decision, we
derive the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 Whenever the disclosure requirement has an impact, the pro-
tective effect of mitigating the threat of entry may be overcompensated by the
disclosure effect so that the higher the technological lead of the inventor, the
lower is his propensity to patent.
Hypothesis 2 In industries in which spillover are easy to use, e.g. because
they are characterized by easy-to-achieve reverse engineering, the technolog-
ical lead will diminish and hence the propensity to patent will increase.
In a next step, we present how we implement our theoretical results into an
estimation equation. From the theoretical model we know that the effective
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technological lead consists of the initial headstart of the inventor which is
eventually decreased by an industry-specific spillover effect:
γ = γ˜(1− λ) = γ˜ − λγ˜.
As stated in Hypotheses 1 and 2, the decision to patent is mainly driven by
the initial headstart. We translate the theoretical result into the following
empirical equation:
P = β1 + β2TL+ β3RE + β4TL ∗RE + Controls, (1)
where P denotes the patenting decision, TL the technological lead and RE
the easiness of reverse engineering. In line with the theoretical findings we
conjecture a negative influence of the technological lead (TL) and a positive
effect of the interaction term of TL and RE. As in the theoretical model
reverse engineering has no direct effect on the propensity to patent, we expect
to find no significant effect empirically.
Given the patenting decision on the second stage of the game firms decide
on when to enter the market. As Zaby (2009) finds that the inventor always
takes the lead, the adoption choice of the non-inventor crucially depends on
the extent of the inventor’s technological headstart. Hence, we come to our
next hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3 The rival’s market entry is delayed if the effective technolog-
ical headstart of the leading innovator is large. Reverse engineering has a
detrimental effect on the technological lead and hence increases the threat of
rival’s entry.
Furthermore, if an inventor chooses to patent, the mandatory disclosure of
the invention enables its rival to enter the market at an earlier point in
time as the inventor loses his lead. As the disclosure effect is opposed by
the protective effect of a patent, the patentee’s competitor might be forced
to postpone his market entry in order to develop a non-infringing product.
This mitigates the threat of entry that the patentee faces and naturally this
effect should be stronger, the higher the level of patent protection is. Thus
we propose the following Hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4 The threat of entry decreases with the intensity of patent pro-
tection, i.e. patent height.
From Proposition 2 of the theoretical model (see Zaby (2009)) we know that
the threat of entry is weakened with either a weak or strongly protective
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patent and that the threat of entry is strongly mitigated with a delaying
patent. In combination with Hypothesis 3 this translates into the following
empirical model:
TOE = β1+β2TL+β3RE+β4TL∗RE+β5DP+β6SP+β7WP+Controls,
where TOE is the threat of entry, DP reflects delaying patents, SP strongly
and WP weakly protective patents. For a definition of TL and RE see the
previous equation. The technological lead, TL, should now have a negative
effect on the threat of entry, i.e. the time until entry increases with the extent
of the technological headstart. The interaction term with reverse engineering
should again reveal the opposite effect while the sole effect of RE should not
be significant. As the theoretical model predicts, a delaying patent should
have a negative effect on the perceived intensity of the threat of entry, while
strong and weak patents should have a negative or an insignificant effect.
3 Data set
The basis for the empirical analysis is the Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP)
of the year 2005. The MIP is an annual survey which is conducted by the
Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) Mannheim. The aim of the
survey is to provide a tool to investigate the innovation behavior of German
manufacturing and service firms. Regularly – currently every two years – the
MIP is the German contribution of Community Innovation Survey (CIS).
Our empirical investigations are based on about 740 firms.
In the year 2005, the survey contained additional questions concerning the
firm’s perception of the competitive situation. Questions concerning the char-
acteristics and the importance of specific competitive factors like price or
quality are asked as well as the perceived competitive situation with respect
to the number of competitors and their relative size.
3.1 Sample definition
In order to test our hypotheses, we need to restrict our sample to innovative
firms, i.e. we exclude firms which did not launch a new product or process
within the period 2002 to 2004. Furthermore, the theoretical model is de-
signed for vertically differentiated products, i.e. the competitive situation
is characterized by quality competition. In the 2005 survey, one question is
aimed at the characterization of the competitive situation on the main pro-
duct market. The firms are asked to rank the following choices according to
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their importance: quality, price, technological advance, advertisement, pro-
duct variety, flexibility towards customers. We keep those observations for
which firms have indicated that quality is the most, second or third most
important feature of competition.
The first part of the empirical analyzes deals with the propensity of patenting
vs. secrecy and whether it depends on technical leadership (Hypotheses 1 and
2). In the theoretical model, patenting and secrecy are excluding categories:
A firm can either patent or keep the R&D results secret.3
For the investigation of the threat of entry (Hypotheses 3 and 4), we need to
include patent height in the data set. For this we used patent information
from the European Patent Office (EPO) for the observation period 2002
to 2004 including the IPC codes stated in every patent application. The
complete classification codes assign a patent into specific clusters which vary
in their aggregational level, see the following table.4
Table 1: International Patent Classification (IPC)
Code of the European Patent Office
Section Class Subclass Group
Main Group Subgroup
A 01 B 33/0 33/08
As a patent may be codified by more than one IPC Code, the variation of
codes is a good indicator for different levels of patent scope.5
3For the empirical implementation, this assumption needs to be treated carefully. In
the data set, we find several examples of firms which use both patenting and secrecy.
Hence, we observe that firms may have more than one innovation and that these may
be treated differently. Assuming that firms which indicate patents as highly important
use patenting as their main IP protection strategy, all other protection strategies are
ignored. Furthermore, all firms which use other formal mechanisms like trademarks are
dropped even if they indicate that they use secrecy. A reason for this procedure is that
formal protection dominates strategic mechanisms and we do not account for other formal
protection methods besides patenting (Blind et al. (2006)).
4Actually also any additional information complementing the invention information
which may be useful for search purposes can be classified by IPC codes through the patent
authorities (§123, IPC Guide). To distinguish the Classification symbols referring to the
invention information and those referring to additional information, the invention infor-
mation symbols are displayed in bold font style while the additional information symbols
are displayed in non-bold font style (§160, IPC Guide). We are currently working on
implementing this distinction in our estimation.
5The IPC Guide gives a quite clear statement on the relation between the IPC code
and the scope of the respective patent.
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Following the theoretical model we define three alternative intensities of
patent protection: weakly protective, strongly protective and delaying patents.
We implement the alternative patent heights from the theoretical model as
follows: Whenever a classification symbol differs on the level of classes or
subclasses, we characterize the respective patent as delaying. We define a
patent as strongly protective, if the IPC codes vary in groups and as weakly
protective, if the IPC codes differ in subgroups. Additionally all patents with
a single IPC code are classified as weakly protective patents.
In a next step we merge this information to the MIP data set we defined
above.6 By this we condense the EPO data to the firm level. Hence, we now
observe firms holding various numbers of delaying, strongly and/or weakly
protective patents. We identified only few firms that stated to hold a patent
in the MIP survey but had no equivalent entry in the EPO data set. Due to
the missing information we dropped these observations.
3.2 Variable definition and descriptive statistics
In this section we describe how we define the core variables of the estimations.
First, we take a look at our dependent variables: Patenting is measured as
a dummy variable indicating whether an inventor uses patenting to protect
his intellectual property. In our data set about 60% of the firms applied for
a patent in the relevant period (see Table 2).
To reflect the extent of the threat of entry (TOE) we refer to a firm’s percep-
tion on whether its market position is threatened by the entry of new rivals,
which is ranked on a 4-digit Likert scale.7 This ordered variable is our indica-
tor whether technological lead and the opposing effect of reverse engineering
induce early market entry by rivals. If the time until the rival’s entry is short,
The titles of sections, subsections and classes are only broadly indicative of
their content and do not define with precision the subject matter falling under
the general indication of the title. In general, the section or subsection titles
very loosely indicate the broad nature of the scope of the subject matter to
be found within the section or subsection, and the class title gives an overall
indication of the subject matter covered by its subclasses. By contrast, it is
the intention in the Classification that the titles of subclasses [...] define as
precisely as possible the scope of the subject matter covered thereby. The titles
of main groups and subgroups [...] precisely define the subject matter covered
thereby [...]
(§68, IPC Guide)
6The merge was conducted by Thorsten Doherr, ZEW, Mannheim, using a computer
assisted matching algorithm on the basis of firm names.
7Respondents could choose between fully applies, rather applies, hardly applies and
does not apply.
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the variable threat of entry should be ranked higher than if the time until
market entry is longer and the effective technological lead is larger. Hence, we
assume that firms rank the threat of entry higher when they fear rival’s entry.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Patenting Decision
Estimation with Vertically Differentiated Products
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
patent 0.595 0.491 0 1
technological lead 0.589 0.492 0 1
reverse engineering 0.684 0.465 0 1
tech. lead * rev. eng. 0.382 0.486 0 1
complexity 0.378 0.485 0 1
log(employees) 4.563 1.696 0.693 9.077
human capital 0.267 0.266 0.000 1.000
R&D intensity 0.066 0.130 0.000 1.100
strong competition 0.132 0.339 0 1
medium competition 0.209 0.407 0 1
EU 0.673 0.469 0 1
non EU 0.491 0.500 0 1
subsidy 0.419 0.494 0 1
customer power 0.303 0.460 0 1
obsolete 0.089 0.285 0 1
tech. change 0.465 0.499 0 1
cooperation 0.453 0.498 0 1
diversification 0.658 0.241 0.003 1.000
east 0.292 0.455 0 1
No. of observation 740
Next we define the explanatory variables. The central variables of the theo-
retical model are technical leadership and the easiness of reverse engineering.
Both constructs are not straightforward to implement empirically. In MIP
2005, technical leadership is defined by the variable temporal headstart over
competitors. Hence, we create a dummy variable indicating whether the
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importance of technological leadership is high. About 60% of all firms state
that technological leadership is a substantial characteristic of the competitive
environment in their main product market.
The other theoretical concept that has to be transformed into empirical terms
is the easiness of reverse engineering. Reverse engineering can also be thought
of as the usability of spillover. As stated in Arundel et al. (1995), reverse
engineering is a characteristic of the industry and not of the firm. We con-
struct a dummy variable which has unit value if the market is characterized
by easy-to-substitute products. Hence, we assume that if the firm’s most
important product is easy to substitute, reverse engineering is a mechanism
that is at work in the industry where it operates. In our data set almost
70% of the innovating firms operate in a market where reverse engineering
prevails.
From the theoretical model we know that the technological leadership of
a firm may be reduced by the possibility of reverse engineering. To im-
plement this fact in our empirical analysis we create an interaction term
(tech. lead * rev. eng.). From Table 2 we know that 38% of all innovating
firms state that their competitive environment is characterized by a high rel-
evance of technical leadership and at the same time reverse engineering plays
an important role.
For the definition of weak, strong and delaying patents see the above section.
According to the descriptive statistics in Table 3 16% of the firms applied for
at least one delaying patent, while only 10% applied for a strong, and 18%
for a weak patent. Note that it is possible that a firm holds various patents
belonging to different categories.
Furthermore, we control for several factors that may influence our dependent
variables. Firm size is represented by the number of employees in the year
2002, human capital by the share of employees holding a university degree.
Market structure is reflected by two dummy variables indicating whether the
number of main competitors is between 6 and 15 (medium competition) or
exceeds 15 (strong competition). Finally we describe the competitive situa-
tion with respect to the geographical dimension of the product market. We
control for two world regions, the EU and non-EU. Germany is considered
separately as it serves as reference category in the regression. Thus it is not
contained in the variable EU.
Costumer power refers to the fact that the share of sales by the three most
important customers exceeds 50% of total sales.
In order to capture whether the market is characterized by certain mar-
ket entry barriers, we control for capital intensity defined as tangible assets
per employee and for R&D intensity defined as expenditures for in-house
R&D activities per sales. If firms cooperate with others, e.g. competitors,
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customers, universities, in conducting R&D this may influence their IP pro-
tection strategy. Therefore we include a dummy variable reflecting whether
research cooperations take place. We also control for public R&D subsidies
by either regional, national or European authorities.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for Threat of Entry
Estimation
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
threat of entry 1.517 0.806 0 3
technological lead 0.413 0.493 0 1
reverse engineering 0.698 0.459 0 1
tech. lead * rev. eng. 0.273 0.446 0 1
delaying 0.160 0.367 0 1
strong 0.096 0.295 0 1
weak 0.183 0.387 0 1
complexity 0.275 0.447 0 1
secrecy 0.525 0.500 0 1
log(employees) 4.147 1.732 0.000 9.077
R&D intensity 0.060 0.281 0.000 6.427
capital intensity 0.124 0.363 0.000 4.554
strong competition 0.191 0.393 0 1
medium competition 0.223 0.417 0 1
new to market 0.434 0.496 0 1
subsidy 0.294 0.456 0 1
obsolete 0.098 0.297 0 1
tech. change 0.484 0.500 0 1
diversification 0.677 0.243 0.005 1.000
east 0.316 0.465 0 1
No. of observations 748
To capture relevant product characteristics, we include an indicator whether
a product becomes obsolete quickly. As the fact that a rapid change of
production or service generating technologies may play an important role
concerning the decision to patent and the perceived threat of market entry the
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respective indicator tech. change is included as control variable. Furthermore
we control for the individual complexity of product design.8 Additionally a
firm’s degree of diversification might be an impact factor in our estimations
so that we use a measure reflecting the share of sales originating from a firm’s
top-selling product or service.
The intensity of the threat of entry may be strongly influenced by the fact
that a product is new to the market. Therefore we include a dummy variable
reflecting whether the responding firm has introduced such a product in the
relevant time period.
In order to capture regional and sectoral differences we include an indicator
whether the firm is located in eastern Germany (east) and define 11 industry
dummies. For the definition of the industry dummies see Table 6 in the
Appendix.
The estimation of the threat of entry further incorporates a control variable
for the use of secrecy as an IP appropriation mechanism. As secrecy may
provide similar protection compared to a patent without the drawback of
mandatory disclosure choosing this protection strategy may have a relevant
impact on the dependent variable .
4 Empirical results
To test our hypotheses regarding firm’s patenting behavior, we estimate a
probit model and calculate the marginal effects evaluated at the sample
means. The standard errors are obtained by using the delta method. The
calculation of the marginal effect of the interaction term is based on Ai ,
Norton (2003). The results are displayed in Table 4.
The theoretical model defines the technological lead by γ = γ˜ − λγ˜ so that
the effect of λ, the easiness of reverse engineering, is only included in the
interaction term λγ˜. For a correct empirical implementation of the theoretical
model our estimation equation nevertheless needs to contain the sole effect of
λ which is implemented by the variable RE. Actually we find an insignificant
effect of RE, so that the theoretical model is confirmed.
The theoretical model predicts that the patenting behavior is negatively influ-
enced by the technological lead of the innovator. This is the basic statement
of Hypothesis 1. Our empirical results correctly display a negative sign of
the respective marginal effect, but it turns out to be insignificant. At first
view this is a puzzling result. The insignificance of the effect states that
8Note that we need to distinguish individual complexity and industry-specific complex-
ity which can be described by the substitutability of products in the respective competitive
environment of a firm.
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whether there is a technological lead or not does not influence firms’ patent-
ing propensity if the industry is characterized by the absence of easiness of
reverse engineering. Suppose a firm’s technological lead is small, then our
theoretical model predicts that the propensity to patent is high. In prac-
tice, patent law requires a sufficiently high inventive step incorporated in the
invention in order to fulfil the patentability requirements. Consequently a
small technological lead is not eligible for patent protection – a fact which is
disregarded by the theoretical model. Hence our empirical finding that the
technological lead has an insignificant effect can be properly substantiated.
Additionally, Zaby (2009) states that in an industry, in which the easiness of
reverse engineering is high, the technological lead is reduced so that patent-
ing becomes more attractive to an innovator. This effect is implemented
empirically by the interaction term of technological lead and reverse engi-
neering which we expect to have a positive effect (see Hypothesis 2). This is
confirmed by the empirical findings.
Interestingly the control variables reflecting the strength of competition with
respect to competitors, customers and regional dimensions are mainly in-
significant for the patenting decision. An exception is the positive effect for
non EU . An intuition for this surprising result is that firms which are inter
alia active in non-EU markets tend to rate protection in their home-market
as more important than firms operating solely in the German home-market.
A possible explanation is that those firms fear the entry of foreign firms with
substitute products. Further we find that R&D cooperation has a positive
significant effect on the propensity to patent whereas being located in Eastern
Germany has a negative impact.
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Table 4: Results of the Patenting Decision Estimation
with Vertically Differentiated Products
Marginal Effect Standard Error
technological lead -0.012 0.040
reverse engineering 0.006 0.043
tech. lead * rev. eng. 0.143* 0.085
complexity -0.060 0.041
log(employees) 0.081*** 0.015
human capital 0.128 0.109
R&D intensity 0.781*** 0.219
strong competition -0.042 0.061
medium competition -0.021 0.049
EU 0.030 0.050
non EU 0.112** 0.045
subsidy 0.102** 0.050
customer power -0.070 0.046
obsolete 0.000 0.072
tech. change -0.042 0.041
cooperation 0.099** 0.047
diversification -0.138 0.088
east -0.110** 0.049
industry dummies included
Log likelihood -382.08
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.235
χ2(all) 235.05***
χ2(ind) 42.33***
Number of observations 740
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects of a probit estimation
regarding the determinants of the patenting decision. Marginal
effects are calculated at the sample means and those of the
interaction terms are obtained according to Ai , Norton (2003).
Standard errors are calculated with the delta method.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry
dummies. For a definition of the industry dummies refer to
Table 6.
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Our industry dummies are jointly significant hinting at structural differences
between industry sectors. However, due to the fact that we explicitly include
the main factors driving these differences in our estimation, e.g. reverse engi-
neering, complexity, technical change, we are not able to confirm significant
differences between sectors.9
After the discussion of the results concerning the first stage of the theoreti-
cal game we now turn to the findings regarding the second stage where the
market entry decision of competitors is analyzed. This decision is empiri-
cally implemented by using firms’ statement with respect to the perceived
importance of the threat of market entry by potential rivals. As threat of
entry is measured on a four-point Likert scale we estimate an ordered probit
model. Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means and standard
errors using the delta method. For the calculation of the interaction effect
we rely on Mallick (2009). The results are depicted in Table 5.
The Hypothesis 3 stating that the interaction term, TL ∗RE, has a positive
impact on the intensity of threat of entry is not confirmed by the estimation
results. However, we find a positive effect of reverse engineering which has to
be interpreted as the effect of reverse engineering in the absence of techno-
logical lead. A possible reasoning behind this finding is that the detrimental
effect of reverse engineering on technological lead is not sufficiently high to
induce a significant impact on the threat of entry, i.e. a significant effect of
the interaction term TL ∗RE.
Regarding Hypothesis 4 the predictions of the theoretical model are under-
lined by the empirical findings. To test the hypothesis we implement three
alternative measures for the intensity of patent protection. The strongest
level of protection, i.e. a delaying patent, has a significant negative effect on
the threat of entry while lower intensities of patent protection, i.e. weak and
strong patents, reveal no significant effect.
Firm’s capital intensity, which can be interpreted as a barrier to market entry
for competitors, is found to have a negative significant effect on the threat
of entry. However, our control variables reflecting the number of competitors
operating in a market show positive significant effects. This opposes our
conjecture that more intensive competition decreases the perceived intensity
of the threat of entry. Our interpretation of this result is that the number
of competitors implicitly reflects the market size. More competitors in the
market may be an indicator for the fact that the market has the potential of
absorbing even more firms. Furthermore it could also be an indicator for a
market with low entry barriers. Following this argument the fact that many
competitors operate in a market can either signal low market entry costs or
9This result originates from tests on the equality of coefficients of industry dummies.
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can signal that the market bears no room for further entry. As we find a
positive significant effect of a market with a large number of competitors,
it must be that market entry barriers are low so that firms perceive a high
threat of further market entry.
In line with economic intuition the empirical results state that if services or
products become obsolete quickly or production technologies change rapidly
this has a positive significant effect on the intensity of the threat of entry.
Further our estimation results show that the lower the level of diversification
in a firm is, the higher this firm rates the intensity of the market entry threat.
Table 5: Ordered Probit for Threat of Entry Estimation
threat strong medium weak no
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
technological lead 0.020 0.028 -0.029 -0.019
(0.016) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015)
reverse engineering 0.039** 0.061*** -0.056** -0.043**
(0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017)
tech. lead * rev. eng. 0.009 0.000 -0.014 0.006
(0.026) (0.041) (0.037) (0.031)
delaying -0.040** -0.067* 0.057** 0.050
(0.018) (0.036) (0.025) (0.031)
strong -0.019 -0.029 0.027 0.021
(0.023) (0.039) (0.033) (0.030)
weak 0.011 0.016 -0.017 -0.010
(0.024) (0.031) (0.035) (0.020)
complexity 0.021 0.028 -0.030 -0.018
(0.017) (0.022) (0.025) (0.015)
secrecy -0.022 -0.031 0.032 0.021
(0.016) (0.023) (0.024) (0.016)
log(employees) 0.005 0.007 -0.007 -0.005
(0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
R&D intensity 0.026 0.036 -0.037 -0.025
(0.025) (0.035) (0.036) (0.024)
capital intensity -0.047** -0.066** 0.068** 0.045**
(0.022) (0.031) (0.033) (0.022)
strong competition 0.060** 0.069*** -0.086*** -0.044***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.033) (0.015)
Table continued on the next page
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threat strong medium weak no
Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff. Marg. Eff.
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
medium competition 0.046** 0.057*** -0.067** -0.037***
(0.022) (0.021) (0.030) (0.014)
new to market -0.019 -0.027 0.028 0.019
(0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.015)
subsidy 0.012 0.016 -0.017 -0.011
(0.017) (0.022) (0.024) (0.015)
obsolete 0.051* 0.058** -0.072* -0.036**
(0.031) (0.029) (0.042) (0.018)
tech. change 0.034** 0.047** -0.049** -0.032**
(0.015) (0.020) (0.022) (0.015)
diversification 0.063** 0.089** -0.092** -0.060**
(0.028) (0.042) (0.041) (0.031)
east -0.029 -0.029 0.029 0.020
(0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.016)
industry dummies included included included included
Log likelihood -417.94
McFadden’s adjusted R2 0.037
χ2(all) 65.21***
χ2(ind) 8.72
Number of observations 748
*** (**, *) indicate significance of 1 % (5 %, 10 %) respectively.
This table depicts marginal effects for an ordered probit of the estimation of threat of entry.
Marginal effects are calculated at the sample means and those of the interaction terms are obtained
according to Mallick (2009). Standard errors are calculated with the delta method.
χ2(all) displays a test on the joint significance of all variables.
χ2(ind) displays a test on the joint significance of the industry dummies. For a definition of the
industry dummies refer to Table 6.
5 Conclusion
This paper intended to empirically test the theoretical results and predic-
tions obtained in Zaby (2009). Several hypotheses summarizing the theoret-
ical results concerning the propensity to patent with vertically differentiated
products thereby formed the basis of the empirical examination.
From the theoretical analysis of the propensity to patent in a market with
vertically differentiated products we deduced four hypothesis. Two refer to
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the first stage of the theoretical model, i.e. the patenting decision of the
inventor, while the others concern the second stage of the model, the market
entry decisions of the firms.
The first, Hypothesis 1, proposes that the higher the technological lead of the
inventor, the lower is his propensity to patent. This could not be confirmed
by our empirical estimation. A possible explanation for this is that the
theoretical approach ignores the fact that minor technological advances are
not applicable for patent protection.
Hypothesis 2 states that if reverse engineering is easy to achieve, the tech-
nological lead is reduced so that patenting becomes more attractive, i.e. the
propensity to patent increases. To test this hypothesis we implemented an
interaction term of technological lead and reverse engineering. As the effect
of the interaction term is found to be positive and significant, this hypothesis
is confirmed.
Regarding the second stage of the theoretical model, Hypothesis 3 suggests
that reverse engineering reduces the technological lead so strongly that the
threat of entry increases. This finding is not confirmed empirically. Since
we find that the single effect of reverse engineering is positive, the effect of
reverse engineering on the technological lead is obviously not strong enough to
induce a positive effect of the interaction term. Nevertheless we can confirm
empirically that the threat of market entry decreases with the intensity of
patent protection, which is a result of the theoretical model formulated in
Hypothesis 4. For a delaying patent, i.e. very strong patent protection, we
find a significant negative effect on the threat of entry.
The probably most puzzling and equivocative result of our theoretical analy-
sis is the finding that the propensity to patent decreases the higher the tech-
nological lead of an innovator is. The commonly perceived intuition suggests
the opposite, namely that an innovation is patented, the greater the techno-
logical advance it embodies. Our empirical estimation offers the solution to
this puzzle: we find that in the model setting the commonly suggested inter-
dependence of technological lead and the propensity to patent only holds if
the respective market is characterized by easy-to-achieve reverse engineering.
Thus the theoretical findings of Zaby (2009) do not contradict common intu-
ition but constrain its validity to markets where reverse engineering is easy.
Consequently, in a market where reverse engineering is difficult, our findings
propose that the propensity to patent decreases when the technological lead
rises.
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Appendix
Table 6: Definition of Industry Dummies
ind NACE code description
1 1, 15, 17, 18, 19 agriculture, food, textile, leather
2 10, 14, 23, 40, 41 mining, coke, fuel, electricity
3 20, 21, 36, 37, 90 wood, paper, publishing, printing,
furniture, recycling, sewage
4 24, 25, 26 chemicals and pharmaceuticals,
plastics, non-metallic mineral products, glass
5 27, 28 metals
6 29, 34, 350, 351, 352, 354, 355 machinery, motor vehicles without aerospace
7 30, 31, 32 office machinery, electrical machinery,
radio television communication
8 33, 353 medical, precision and optical
instruments, aerospace
9 64, 72 telecommunication, post and communication,
computer services
10 73 research & development
11 74 business activities
Industry category 11 is the reference category and is not included in regressions.
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